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ABSTRACT
Conflicts among client and vendor in IS outsourcing can negatively affect their relationship and outsourcing project success.
However, there is little research done on the antecedents of conflicts and conflict resolution. In this research study, we utilize
concepts from marketing, operations management, and management fields to develop a comprehensive research model for
studying conflict..
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INTRODUCTION
Conflicts in outsourcing are a result of differences of interests in client and vendors (Lacity and Hirschheim 1995; Vining and
Globerman 1999).  One of the major risks in IS outsourcing is contractual conflicts, which start creeping in right after the
contract is signed. They arise because of: differences in objectives of the client and vendor; incomplete contract, not covering
all future contingencies; different interpretations of the contract; change in the business needs and requirements of the client;
or technological changes. In case of large contracts, multiple vendors may be involved. Presence of conflict among the
vendors also affects the client-vendor relationship (Choi et. al 2002).
If conflicts are not resolved amicably, the hostility and bitterness resulting from them can lead to negative consequences
including relationship dissolution (Morgan and Hunt 1994). As outsourcing relationships evolve from arm’s length,
transaction-based relationships to strategic relationships, resolving conflicts becomes particularly important.
Organizational literature has studied conflicts in alliances, joint ventures and partnerships, but very few studies have
examined conflicts in IS outsourcing. Kern and Silva (1998) investigated the issue of power to map the areas of potential
conflicts in outsourcing. Sun et al. (2002) found conflict mediated the impact of trust on partnership satisfaction. While these
studies provide important insights about conflicts, there is a need to identify key antecedents of conflicts in IS outsourcing.
In this study, we develop a comprehensive framework for conflicts and conflict resolution through a synthesis and application
of well developed concepts and theories. We investigate a two-dimensional representation of conflict, frequency and
intensity. The objective is to identify sources of conflict and factors that may lead to conflict resolution in order to develop
more co-operative and performance enhancing relationships and increase the likelihood of outsourcing project success..
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
Relationship Marketing
The concept of relationship marketing emphasizes relationship building in buyer-seller interactions. Here, conflict is treated
as a two-sided construct. If conflicts are not resolved, they can lead to relationship termination. If conflicts are resolved, they
may increase productivity in relationship marketing (Morgan and Hunt 1994). This holistic view of conflict centres on the
presence of commitment and trust in building a successful relationship.
Relational Exchange
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This theory suggests that the governance structure of a relationship can be arranged on a continuum of market and hierarchy
as the two extremes. IS outsourcing arrangements are becoming long-term, hybrid relationships. Firms participate in
relational exchanges in expectation of perceived benefits or in anticipation of outcomes that are greater than those possible
from other business alternatives (Mohr and Spekman 1994).
Psychological Contract
Psychological contract theory focuses on people’s mental beliefs and expectations about their mutual obligations in a
contractual relation (Rousseau 1995). An outsourcing contract involves bilateral obligations which are beyond mutual
expectations and based upon perceived promises of a reciprocal exchange. A failure to meet obligations is likely to lead to
erosion of the trust and relationship between the client and vendor, and this will impact vendor’s satisfaction (Koh et al.
2004).
Social Exchange
According to Fischer and Bristor (1994), social exchange theory explicitly predicts that social relationships are formed on the
basis of partner’s motivational investment and anticipated social benefits that would not be achievable on their own. When
these benefits are not fulfilled for the participants in outsourcing, it can potentially lead to a strain in the relationship and
conflict may arise.
Transaction Cost
Transaction cost theory (Williamson 1976) is used to determine appropriate governance structures in buyer-seller
transactions. The theory suggests that high level of uncertainty, exchange frequency, and asset specificity can increase
termination costs for both the client and vendor. Opportunism and threats of switching by a party can deter other party’s
potential gains from making relationship specific investments (such as dedicated staffing and specialized
equipment/software).
Expectation Confirmation
Expectation confirmation theory states that customer satisfaction develops from a customer’s comparison of post-purchase
evaluation of a product or service with pre-purchase expectations. In outsourcing, vendors expect benefits such as building
industry reputation, winning future contracts, and augmenting their competencies (Levina and Ross 2003) while clients
expect economic and strategic benefits. When the expectations of benefit (economic or non-economic) for the outsourcing
participants are not met, it leads to dissatisfaction.
RESEARCH MODEL
Building upon the theoretical foundation, we propose a conceptual framework (Figure 1). The framework hypothesizes a
number of factors likely to impact conflicts and conflict resolution in IS outsourcing. Conflict resolution is the endogenous
construct and communication, fulfilment of obligations, termination cost, and confirmation of expected benefits are
exogenous constructs. Their relationship is mediated by trust, commitment and number of conflicts in an outsourcing
relationship.
 2726
Parolia and Parikh                Conflicts in IS Outsourcing: Developing a Research Model
Proceedings of the Eleventh Americas Conference on Information Systems, Omaha, NE, USA August 11th-14th 2005
Factors Operational Definition Related Literature
Communication
with the Partner
The formal and informal sharing of information or meaning
between client and vendor
(Anderson and Narus 1990;
Sun et. al 2002)
Fulfilment of
Obligation by the
Partner
A partner’s perception that the other partner will implement
its mutual obligations (based upon the partner’s beliefs).
(Rousseau, 1989 79; Koh
et.al 2004)
Trust in the
Partner
A partner’s belief that the other partner will perform actions
that will result in positive outcomes for the partner as well as
not take unexpected actions that result in negative outcomes.
(Anderson and Narus 1990;
Morgan and Hunt 1994)
Relationship
Commitment
Degree of the pledge of relationship continuity of the partner (Morgan and Hunt 1994)
Relationship
Termination Cost
A partner’s perception of the costs associated with
terminating a current relationship and establishing a
relationship with another partner.
(Liu and Leach 2003;
Morgan and Hunt 1994)
Confirmation of
expected benefits
A partner’s perception of conformity between expectations of
benefit from IS outsourcing and actual benefits received.
(Olshavsky and Miller 1972;
Mohr and Spekman 1994
Levina and Ross 2003)
Conflict The frequency and intensity of disagreement between client
and vendor
(Robey et. al 1989; Barki,
and Hartwick 2001; Morgan
and Hunt 1994)
Conflict
Resolution
The lessening or elimination of the disagreement between IS
outsourcing client and vendor
(Robey et. al 1989; Barki
and Hartwick 2001)
Fulfilment of
Obligation by the
Partner
A partner’s perception that the other partner will implement
its mutual obligations (based upon the partner’s beliefs).
(Rousseau, 1989 79; Koh
et.al 2004)
Table 1. Factors and Related Literature
According to relationship marketing, communication is one of the important antecedents of a successful relationship (Morgan
and Hunt 1994). Past communication, from both supplier-customer perspectives, is positively related to trust (Anderson and
Narus 1990). IS outsourcing involves communication between client and vendor in all stages of the project. A direct
 2727
Parolia and Parikh                Conflicts in IS Outsourcing: Developing a Research Model
Proceedings of the Eleventh Americas Conference on Information Systems, Omaha, NE, USA August 11th-14th 2005
manifestation of either partner’s involvement in the outsourcing project is in the communication with the other partner. Thus,
we hypothesize,
H1: The degree of communication between two partners will positively affect their
trust in each other.
A fulfilment of unwritten (psychological contract) and written (contract document) obligations by client and vendor will
result in an expansion of their relational trust leading to positive beliefs. The unwritten obligations especially in outsourcing
involving multimillion dollar deals assume greater importance, since the legal contract is usually so long and complex that it
is impractical to disseminate it to all involved individuals (Koh et. al 2004). Even though Rousseau (1989) argued that
concept of unwritten obligations does not apply to organizations, Koh et. al (2004) demonstrated that psychological contracts
played an important role in the development of the outsourcing relationships. Hence,
H2: The mutual fulfilment of the obligations by the partners will positively affect their trust in each other.
Trust is one of the most desired qualities in any close relationship (Anderson and Narus 1990; Sabherwal 1999). Trust exists
when one party has confidence in an exchange partner’s reliability and integrity (Morgan and Hunt 1994). Outsourcing
relationships based on a formal contract and rooted in mutual trust give rise to stronger bonds between clients and their
service providers (Sabherwal 1999). Several empirical studies have already shown that trust in a partner has a positive impact
on relationship commitment. Hence,
H3: The degree of trust between two partners will positively affect commitment in each other.
In outsourcing relationship, both partners develop interdependency through their mutual complimentarity (Levina and Ross,
2003). The degree of interdependency depends on the level of economic and relationship investments made by the partners in
the relationship. The partners risk losing these investments, when the relationship terminates. However, if such investments
are low, the termination cost is low and a partner will feel less committed to the relationship. Hence,
H4: The termination cost for each partner will positively affect their commitment to each other.
Firms enter into relationship with a goal of deriving mutual benefits (Mohr and Spekman 1994). These expectations would
enforce partner’s commitment to outsourcing success. A continuation of the relationship over the long term would encourage
increased cooperation among the partners. When partners achieve expected benefits, it vindicates their motive of entering
into outsourcing relationship and increases relationship commitment. We extend expectation-confirmation theory to
hypothesize that when expectations of benefit are not met, it decreases the commitment among the partners. Hence,
H5: The confirmation of expected benefits for each partner will positively affect their trust in each other.
Kemp and Ghauri (1999) suggest that trust and norms, which are results of long-term relationship development, reduce the
potential for conflict. Prior literature has shown that trust lead to higher levels of inter-organizational cooperative behaviours
such as shared planning and flexibility. Trust developed through past experience in working with the same partner influences
stability in future projects. Hence,
H6: The degree of trust between two partners will negatively affect the conflict between them.
Social exchange theory argues that an exchange partner is likely to remain in the relationship if its perceived reward is less
than the cost. Firms understand that the costs of retaining current partners are far less than the costs associated with
terminating existing relationships and finding new partners, therefore mechanisms for resolving conflicts are critical to
building and maintaining relationships. Committed partners balance short-term problems with long term goal achievement
(Mohr and Spekman 1994). In outsourcing relationships, both contractual commitment and relationship commitment are
recognized as crucial preconditions for the outsourcing partners to be proactive beyond what the contract suggests (Kern and
Willcocks 2002). Therefore,
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H7: The degree of commitment between two partners will positively affect the conflict resolution.
Conflict resolution is the extent to which the client and vendor are able to replace objections by agreement and consensus
between them. In conflict resolution, we distinguish between two facets of conflict: intensity and frequency (Robey et. al
1989). A "frequency" interpretation of conflict suggests that the more numerous the conflicts that client and vendors are
engaged in, the less likely it is that they will resolve each and every one of them to their satisfaction, possibly due to
insufficient time or energy. An "intensity" interpretation suggests that the greater the intensity of a conflict that vendor and
client are engaged in, the less likely it is that they will resolve it to their satisfaction, possibly due to the greater importance of
the issue or greater differences between them (Robey et. al 1989; Barki, and Hartwick 2001). Hence our hypothesis,
H8: The number of conflicts between two partners will negatively affect conflict resolution.
THE RESEARCH PLAN
The aim of this research is to build a model and test its veracity through an empirical evaluation. The unit of analysis would
be an outsourcing project. We aim to utilize qualitative and quantitative techniques to develop the survey. The participants
are expected to be senior management, IT/business unit managers, and project/contract managers who are responsible for
managing the outsourcing arrangement. The participants will be initially interviewed to determine the broad factors which
contribute to conflict. Survey measures would be developed on the basis of the interview results. The questionnaire would
measure project details such as cost, number of vendors involved, length of relationship, financial and strategic importance
etc.
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